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ABSTRACT
Real estate investment trust (REIT) stock prices deviate substantially from net asset values (NAV).
Using REIT data since 1990, we find large positive excess returns to a strategy of buying stocks that
trade at a discount to NAV, and shorting stocks trading at a premium to NAV. Estimated alphas from
this strategy are between 0.9% and 1.8% per month, with little risk. Trading costs and short-sale
constraints are not prohibitive and the results strengthen when we control for differences in liquidity
or the extent of institutional ownership. We find that some variation in P/NAV makes sense, as
premiums are positively related to recent and future NAV growth. However, there appears to be too
much volatility in P/NAV, giving rise to potential profits from short-term mean reversion. The
closed-end fund literature has some similar findings on stock price deviations from fundamental
value, but compared to closed-end funds REITs are much larger and have much higher insider and
institutional ownership. These differences suggest that REIT premiums and discounts reflect more
than just small investor sentiment, which is a common explanation of why closed-end fund prices
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Do stock prices reflect fundamental values?  This question has badgered the finance 
profession for decades.  For most operating companies, or for the market as a whole, it is 
difficult to assess fundamental value.  Fundamental value requires an assessment of future cash 
flows, along with an appropriate risk-adjusted discount rate. 
In this paper, we look at a class of publicly traded operating companies where it is much 
easier to measure fundamental values:  real estate investment trusts (REITs).  REITs own and 
operate relatively illiquid real estate assets.  However, these underlying assets can be valued 
fairly precisely by real estate professionals based on rental data, square footage, and transactions 
in comparable properties and locations, among other inputs.
 1   We have obtained estimates of 
NAV from Green Street Advisors, a buy-side investment advisor that regularly appraises the real 
estate holdings of major REITs.  This enables us to look at REIT premiums and discounts to 
NAV, and whether these premiums and discounts can be used to generate profitable trading 
strategies. 
We find that there are large cross-sectional differences in expected returns.  It is 
profitable to buy REITs trading at a relative discount, and short REITs trading at a relative 
premium to NAV.  The results are robust.  Trading costs are low relative to excess returns.  
Short-sale constraints are not important, because most of the excess returns are on the long side.  
In fact, this strategy has better risk-return characteristics than momentum, widely considered the 
most persistent and unexplained excess return anomaly. 
If REIT prices eventually revert toward NAV, what causes them to deviate in the first 
place?  It turns out that premiums and discounts are associated with future changes in NAV, 
which suggests that stock prices have some predictive power for future fundamental value.  This 
predictive power would justify modest departures from P/NAV = 1.  However, our mean-
reversion evidence on the predictability of returns implies that the stock market exhibits excess 
volatility for some reason – the premium or discount is too large. 
                                                 
1 This methodology is not limited to REITs.  In fact, analysts often use a similar methodology to assess the value of 
natural resource companies, multiplying the amount of proven reserves by the current and forecast price of the 
resource and subtracting off an estimate of extraction costs.  While such estimates of fundamental value may be less 
precise than for real estate, nonetheless they provide an attractive benchmark for valuation that is used in many 
contexts.    
  2In some ways, REITs are similar to closed-end funds.  Both are investment trusts, and in 
both asset types fundamental value can be assessed by valuing the underlying assets.  Thus, our 
results are closely related to the literature on closed-end fund prices.  Closed-end funds pose a 
similar puzzle:  most closed-end funds hold publicly traded securities, with net asset values 
(NAVs) that are published weekly, yet their share prices wander considerable distances from 
NAV.  It is impossible to do justice here to the complete literature on closed-end funds; Dimson 
and Minio-Kozerski (1999) provide a useful survey.  There are reasons to expect prices to differ 
from NAV, including expected future trading and management costs (Malkiel, 1977), expected 
manager performance (Chay and Trzcinka, 1999), tax liabilities and tax timing (Brickley, 
Manaster, and Schallheim, 1991), and market segmentation (Bonser-Neal, Brauer, Neal, and 
Wheatley, 1990).  However, most of these effects are invariant through time.  It is much more 
difficult to account for the time-variation in discounts and premiums without a behavioral 
explanation. 
Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) claim that discounts on closed-end funds reflect 
(individual) investor sentiment.  They point out that closed-end funds are mainly held by 
individuals and are largely shunned by institutional investors.  In contrast, REIT institutional 
ownership is quite high, with institutions owning about half of REIT shares, and we find that the 
predictability of REIT returns is weakly increasing in the level of institutional ownership.  Both 
these facts suggest that discounts and premiums on REITs are not solely due to investor 
sentiment, unless institutions themselves are subject to the same kinds of sentiment.   
This paper is also related to empirical studies on how specific fundamental information is 
incorporated into prices.  For example, Womack (1996) finds that stock prices react strongly and 
quickly to changes in analyst recommendations, though prices continue to drift in the same 
direction over the next several months.  In contrast, for REITs, we find that information 
incorporation is surprisingly slow.  When NAVs are released to clients, they can immediately 
trade on the information.  A week later, less than half of the information has found its way into 
price. 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides a quick overview of real estate 
investment trusts.  Section 3 details the Green Street appraisal data that we use and discusses 
reasons why REIT share prices might depart from the assessment of net asset value.  Section 4 
provides the main results, based on sorting REITs into portfolios based on their ratio of price to 
  3NAV.  Section 5 provides a number of robustness tests and considers transaction costs and other 
impediments to a trading strategy based on mean reversion.  Section 6 considers alternative risk 
factors that might account for the profits identified here, and Section 7 shows that variation in 
P/NAV predicts future NAV growth, indicating that the market is able to differentiate between 
fast-growing and slow-growing REITs. Section 8 draws some parallels to the closed-end fund 
literature but also highlights the important differences.  Section 9 concludes. 
 
2.  Background on REITs 
 
With certain key tax-related exceptions, REITs are similar to other corporations.  Like 
other corporations, REITs initiate operations by raising capital from external markets and 
investing the capital in operating assets.  The benefit of qualifying as a REIT is avoiding the 
double taxation of equity-financed investment.  Unlike regular corporations, REITs receive an 
annual tax deduction for dividends paid out to shareholders.  REITs often distribute all of their 
taxable income to shareholders each year, which eliminates the corporate tax altogether. 
To qualify as a REIT, among other things, a firm must meet certain asset and income 
tests that set minimum levels of real estate activity to prevent REITs from using their tax-
advantaged status in non-real-estate activities.  REITs must earn at least 75 percent of their 
income from real estate-related investments and 95 percent of their income from these sources as 
well as dividends, interest and gains from securities sales.  In addition, at least 75 percent of their 
assets must be invested in real estate, mortgages, REIT shares, government securities, or cash.  
While older REITs were often passive investors, several changes in tax rules in the late 1980s 
allowed REITs to actively manage their assets during the 1990s. Although some REITs invest in 
real estate mortgages, we restrict our focus to publicly traded equity REITs, which primarily 
invest in rental properties. 
In addition to the asset and income tests, tax law requires REITs to pay out a minimum 
percentage of their taxable income as dividends each year.  For most of our sample period, this 
percentage was 95 percent; however, tax changes in 2000 reduced the minimum percentage to 90 
percent.  This distribution requirement is based on taxable income rather than financial reporting 
income.  Despite this requirement, REITs have some discretionary cash flow because operating 
cash flow typically exceeds taxable income, especially since depreciation allowances reduce 
taxable income but not cash flow.  In general, however, the distribution requirement limits 
  4REITs' ability to finance investment with internally generated funds, so they rely more heavily 
on secondary equity issues than do regular corporations. 
 
3. Data Description 
 
The relatively straightforward nature of REITs' assets (compared to industrial firms) 
leads many analysts to value REITs by appraising their properties and other assets.  The key 
explanatory variable for our empirical work is one set of these appraisals from Green Street 
Advisors, Inc.  Green Street computes Net Asset Value (NAV) based on the estimated market 
value of each REIT's assets by assessing the value of the major properties of a REIT (plus other 
miscellaneous assets) and subtracting the liabilities of the REIT.  Green Street's goal is to 
compare the market value of the REIT's common stock with the market value of the underlying 
assets (after adjusting for other ownership claims).  They use these estimates to advise clients 
(typically large institutional investors) on selecting REITs as investments.   
Several factors motivate using the Green Street NAV estimates.  Industry observers and 
participants almost uniformly agree that Green Street produces the most careful and accurate 
estimates in the REIT industry.  It is the only analyst firm to have a consistent set of estimates 
prior to 1996.  Green Street focuses exclusively on real estate firms and each of its analysts 
follows only a few firms.  These analysts specialize by type of property and compute NAV by 
determining the fair market value of each property owned by a REIT, often visiting larger 
properties.  Finally, Green Street performed no investment banking functions for REITs over our 
sample period, so it is immune from the potential conflicts of interest that may impact the 
research of investment banks that underwrite securities. 
We use the Green Street estimates of NAV as a measure of the underlying value of a 
REIT's assets.  An important question to keep in mind is whether the Green Street estimates are 
public information available to all investors or private information that is only available to the 
managers of the firm and certain private investors.  We believe that the Green Street information 
is somewhere between public information and purely private information.  The existence of 
Green Street NAVs is well-known to the institutional investor community.  However, the NAVs 
themselves are available to institutions in return for commission trading business; Green Street 
does not release the information to non-clients. 
  5   We use data on Green Street NAVs from January 1990 through December 2003.  The 
number of equity REITs expanded over the course of our sample period, from 58 REITs with 
$5.5 billion of total market capitalization in 1990, to 144 REITs with a total market capitalization 
of over $205 billion by the end of 2003.  All of the growth in the number of REITs came 
between 1990 and 1995.  Since then, on net, the industry has been characterized by consolidation 
and expansion of existing REITs.
2  Our sample matches Green Street’s coverage of REITs, 
which expanded in line with the overall sector.  At the beginning of the sample, Green Street 
covers 16 REITs.  By December 2003, there are 59 REITs in our sample.  Though Green Street 
covers about 41% of all REITs, the firm covers almost all large REITs and many smaller ones.  
Our sample reflects about 73% of the total capitalization in the sector. 
From 1990 through 1993, Green Street released NAVs quarterly.  Beginning in 1994, 
Green Street released NAVs at the end of every month.  Until 2000, Green Street reports were 
mailed to clients approximately five days before the end of the month in order to ensure arrival 
by the end of the month.  Beginning in 2000, Green Street delivered its research electronically, 
and NAV data became available to all clients after the close of trading on the first trading day of 
the month. 
Our key explanatory variable is P/NAV, the ratio of the REIT's month-end share price 
(taken from data from the University of Chicago's Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP)) to Green Street's estimate of the REIT's NAV.  Over our sample period, the mean 
(median) share-price-to-NAV ratio is 1.03 (1.01).  While the central tendency of this ratio is 
close to one, there is substantial time-series and cross-sectional variation.  Figure 1 plots the 25th 
percentile, median, and 75th percentile price-to-NAV ratio by month for 1994-2003.  The 
interquartile range for P/NAV is typically about 0.20, though it has narrowed slightly over time. 
It is important to emphasize that in this paper we are most interested in cross-sectional 
differences in P/NAV.  Nevertheless, it is clear from Figure 1 that the average REIT P/NAV also 
varies over time, with the median value above 1.20 for all of 1997 and below 0.9 for most of 
2000.  Clayton and MacKinnon (2003) argue that this industry-wide component represents a 
form of investor sentiment for REITs.  Aggregate P/NAV appears to be stationary and mean-
reverting, which implies that there might also be a successful trading strategy that emphasizes 
market timing rather than picking stocks from the cross-section.  However, forecasting 
                                                 
2 Industry statistics are from the National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts’ website at www.nareit.org. 
  6regressions indicate that average P/NAV does not reliably forecast future aggregate REIT 
returns, so we focus on the cross-section in the rest of the paper.
3  
Should P/NAV = 1 for REITs?  Of course, real estate appraisals are imperfect, so we 
would never expect this to hold identically through time, but an average P/NAV = 1 is clearly the 
benchmark for a counterfactual frictionless world.  Given the straightforward nature of REIT 
operations, REIT price-to-NAV has significant advantages over market-to-book ratios for other 
operating firms, a point emphasized by Gentry and Mayer (2003) and Capozza and Seguin 
(2003).  However, there are potential reasons for an equilibrium P/NAV ratio that differs from 
one.  For example, Gentry, Kemsley and Mayer (2003) argue that a REIT’s price should be less 
than its NAV if its tax basis in its properties is below market value; they find evidence consistent 
with this prediction.  A REIT might also trade below its NAV if there are additional costs 
associated with operating a REIT versus alternative organizational forms for holding real estate, 
including the costs of potential conflicts of interest between managers and investors. 
One can, however, make a case that the P/NAV ratio can be above one.  If a REIT has 
good management, and that management does not appropriate all the economic rents that it 
generates, then investors will be willing to bid the REIT share price up above NAV.  Similarly, if 
costs of capital are lower in the public markets, perhaps due to the benefits of liquidity, then 
prices might be above NAV. 
However, these arguments are mostly about average levels of P/NAV.  As in the case of 
closed-end funds, it is much harder to tell a coherent story of why discounts and premiums 
should revert, or why discounts should move to premiums.  To put it another way, in an efficient 
market, if NAV is known to a large set of investors, it should be impounded into prices.  P/NAV 
should not predict the cross-section of REIT returns unless it is associated with some sort of 
priced risk.  In the next section, we show that there is indeed substantial mean reversion.  High 
P/NAV stocks have low subsequent returns, and low P/NAV stocks have high subsequent 
returns, even after adjusting for known risk factors. 
 
                                                 
3 To be precise, we regress rt,t+j, the value-weighted return on our sample of REITs between time t and time t+j, on 
an intercept and the value-weighted P/NAV at time t.  When j = 12 months, the slope coefficient is -0.34 and the R
2 
is 11.4%.  The time series is very short, only about 10 years, and the predictor variable is very persistent (with a 
monthly autocorrelation of 0.95), which together suggest low statistical power.  Simulations based on Stambaugh 
(1999) confirm that the estimated slope coefficient is indistinguishable from zero for all forecasting horizons (p = 
0.545 at the 1-year horizon). 
  74.  Methodology and results 
 
Each month, we consider all REITs for which Green Street reports an NAV per share.  
These REITs are sorted into quartiles based on share price divided by NAV.  In the early part of 
the sample, NAVs were available to clients by the end of the month.  In the latter part of the 
sample, NAVs were posted at the close of the first trading day of the month.  Thus, to ensure that 
the NAVs are in an investor’s information set, we examine returns beginning on the second 
trading day of the month.  We examine value-weighted returns over the next day, week, month, 
and quarter. 
Summary statistics on these portfolios, for the end of 2001, can be found in Table 1.  
REITs in the lowest P/NAV quartile trade at slight discounts to NAV.  These stocks have an 
average market capitalization of $1.1 billion at the end of 2001, and insider ownership averages 
15% of shares outstanding.  These stocks trade an average of just over 140,000 shares per day, 
and the average proportional bid-ask spread on these low P/NAV stocks is 0.7%.  REITs in the 
highest P/NAV quartile tend to be considerably larger, with an average market capitalization of 
$3 billion at the end of 2001.  Perhaps as a result of this, they tend to have slightly lower inside 
ownership (11% of shares outstanding), and they tend to be slightly more liquid, with an average 
proportional bid-ask spread of 0.5% and average trading volume of 423,263 shares. 
Over the next several months, low P/NAV stocks substantially outperform high P/NAV 
stocks.  For the month after sorting into quartiles, stocks in the lowest P/NAV quartile have a 
value-weighted average return of 1.08% per month, while stocks in the highest P/NAV quartile 
have an average monthly return of -0.04%.  Figure 2 provides a comparison of the cumulative 
returns of the value-weighted average returns of the lowest P/NAV quartile (Quartile 1) and the 
highest P/NAV quartile (Quartile 4) for roughly three months (75 trading days) following the 
sort date.  In the first month after sorting on P/NAV, the average return of the low P/NAV REITs 
is about 1.0% but the average return of the high P/NAV REITs is roughly zero.  This difference 
accumulates fairly steadily over the first 20 days after sorting the firms.  After this initial 
difference in returns, the portfolios have roughly similar performance so that by the end of the 75 
trading day period, the difference in the average return on the two portfolios is still roughly one 
percentage point. 
These average return differences are substantial but could just be compensation for risk.  
To adjust for known systematic risk factors, we take a standard time-series approach originally 
  8introduced by Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972) in testing the CAPM.  We also use the risk 
factors introduced by Fama and French (1993).
4  
All stocks in a quartile are aggregated into a single value-weighted portfolio, and monthly 
or quarterly returns on portfolio i are projected on contemporaneous factor returns: 
 r it = αi + βi
RMRF RMRFt + βi
SMB SMBt + βi
HML HMLt + εit, (1) 
where RMRF (return on the market portfolio above the risk free rate of return) is the excess 
return over the T-bill rate of the value-weighted portfolio of all CRSP stocks, SMB (small minus 
big) is a size factor, defined as the return on small firms in excess of the return on big firms, and 
HML (high minus low) is the value factor, defined as the return on high book-to-market stocks 
less the return on low book-to-market stocks.  All three factors are taken from Ken French’s 
website.  REIT portfolio returns, rit, are excess returns over the T-bill rate.  The intercept in this 
regression, or alpha, is the average excess return on the portfolio after adjusting for these three 
known risk factors. 
As noted above, since Green Street expanded its coverage over the course of the sample 
period, the number of REITs in each quartile increases over time.  This affects estimation of the 
time-series regression equation since fewer REITs means noisier estimates of the factor loadings 
and larger residual variance, rendering ordinary least squares techniques inefficient.  To correct 
for this, we weight by the number of REITs in the portfolio in a given period. 
New Green Street data become available every month, and we form portfolios and 
calculate returns every time NAV data become available.  At the quarterly horizon, forming 
portfolios every month creates overlap across adjacent observations.  Newey-West (1987) 
standard errors with two lags are used to adjust for this overlap. 
For monthly and quarterly returns, we also estimate a single-factor CAPM version of this 
model that includes the market factor (RMRF) as the only risk factor.  For returns one day and 
one week after portfolio formation, we estimate only the single factor version, because daily and 
weekly SMB and HML realizations are not readily available. 
The results are in Table 2a.  Both the intercepts and slope coefficients are noteworthy.  
All four quartile portfolios load similarly on the three Fama-French factors, suggesting a 
common industry-wide pattern to returns.  All have fairly modest loadings on the market 
                                                 
4 Relevant applications of this methodology include Carhart (1997) to mutual fund performance and Barber et al. 
(2001) to consensus analyst recommendations, among many others. 
  9portfolio, with a range of 0.28 to 0.47 for monthly returns.  REIT returns seem to behave like 
returns for small firms; all four quartiles load positively and reliably on the small firm factor, 
with coefficients between 0.23 and 0.45.  Finally, REITs load positively on the value factor, with 
coefficients ranging from 0.24 to 0.33, which is sensible since REITs generally have large 
dividends and limited growth opportunities.   
The alphas in Table 2a confirm the simple average return differences noted above.  We 
continue to focus first on monthly returns.  In the single factor model, low P/NAV REITs 
(quartile 1) have a statistically significant positive alpha of 0.84% per month, or more than 10% 
on an annualized basis.  REITs with a high P/NAV (quartile 4) have a slightly negative estimated 
alpha of –0.17% per month, which is statistically indistinguishable from zero.  Alphas in the 
Fama-French three-factor specification are somewhat lower, but the difference across portfolios 
is quite similar to the results from the single-factor model.  Low P/NAV REITs (quartile 1) have 
an estimated alpha of 0.66% per month that is statistically different from zero at the 95 percent 
confidence level, while REITs in quartile 4 have an estimated alpha of −0.28%. 
As a stronger test of predictability of returns based on P/NAV, Table 2b examines the 
returns on portfolio 1 minus the returns on portfolio 4.  This corresponds to a trading strategy 
that buys low P/NAV stocks and shorts an equal dollar amount of high P/NAV stocks.  If there is 
a factor common to all REITs, this strategy should eliminate exposure to the industry factor.  The 
results indicate that the zero-investment portfolio hedges out much of the factor risk.  Again we 
focus first on the monthly returns to this trading strategy.  The simple CAPM beta is only 0.18, 
and the Fama-French factor loadings are similarly small (0.22 and 0.086).  However, the alphas 
are economically large and statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level.  For the 
single-factor model, the estimated alpha is 1.0% per month and for the three-factor model the 
estimated alpha is 0.94% per month, more than 11% per year.   
One motivation for examining returns at various horizons is to assess how quickly REIT 
prices incorporate the Green Street information.  Consistent with the unadjusted return data 
presented in Figure 2, the answer seems to be that prices adjust quite slowly.  Consider for 
example the return differences of Table 2b.  The one-month CAPM alpha is 1.0%.  One day after 
publication of the NAVs, the estimated alpha of 0.097% is one-tenth the size of the one-month 
estimate.  After one week, less than half of the information has been incorporated, with an 
  10estimated alpha of 0.45%.  Thus, it appears that excess returns persist for some time, giving 
institutions ample opportunity to trade on the information. 
Most of the information, however, appears to be impounded within one month.  Over a 
three-month horizon, the CAPM estimated alpha on the long-short strategy is 1.0%, which is the 
same as over the one-month horizon; for the three-factor model, the point estimate of alpha over 
the three-month horizon (0.77%) is slightly smaller than the estimated alpha over the one-month 
horizon (0.94%).  To put it another way, profits to this trading strategy do not continue to accrue 
after the information is one month old.  Furthermore, in both cases, the standard error of the 
estimated alpha for the three-month horizon is almost triple the standard error from the one-
month horizon, suggesting the precision of the estimated excess return falls as the horizon 
expands.   
The trading strategies so far consider only cross-sectional variation in P/NAV.  However, 
Figure 1 demonstrates that the average REIT P/NAV varies over time.  Thus, it might be possible 
to exploit this time-series mean reversion by looking at absolute levels of P/NAV rather than just 
relative rankings.  To investigate this, we set arbitrary breakpoints for P/NAV at 90%, 100%, and 
110%, and sort REITs into portfolios based on these breakpoints.  REITs are not always evenly 
distributed across these portfolios.  In fact, in some months some of the portfolios are empty.  
For example, portfolio 4, which consists of REITs with price greater than 110% of NAV, has 
stocks in it for only 90 out of 120 months. 
Once these portfolios are formed based on the premium or discount to NAV, the same 
econometric approach is taken.  Returns are regressed on either a single market factor or the 
three Fama-French risk factors and the regression is weighted by the number of REITs in the 
portfolio for that period. 
Returns on these portfolios are summarized in Table 3a.  Again, REITs with low P/NAV 
have the highest subsequent returns.  REITs with P/NAV less than 90% are in portfolio 1, and 
these stocks have an average CAPM alpha of 1.30% in the next month.  The alphas decline 
monotonically across portfolios, and high P/NAV REITs in portfolio 4 have an insignificant 
average CAPM alpha of –0.22% in the following month.  As in the earlier analysis, the alphas 
from the three-factor model yield a similar cross-sectional pattern to that of the alphas from the 
single-factor model. 
  11Again, the cross-sectional patterns suggest a long-short strategy that buys REITs with 
low P/NAV and shorts REITs with high P/NAV.  We examine portfolio 1 returns minus portfolio 
4 returns, and for simplicity we include only those months where both the long and the short 
portfolio are non-empty.  This yields 90 monthly returns out of a possible 120.
5  Table 3b 
documents that this strategy has very high returns and little systematic risk.  Focusing on one-
month returns, the estimated alpha from the single-factor model is 1.8% per month (21% 
annualized) and the estimated alpha from the Fama-French model is 1.7% per month (20% 
annualized).  Both of these estimates are statistically distinguishable from zero at the 95 percent 
confidence level.  Adding the time series dimension to the predictability of returns (instead of 
focusing solely on the cross-sectional patterns of returns as we did in Table 2) increases the 
magnitude of the estimated excess returns by over 50 percent. 
As with the previous results, the evolution of the estimated alpha over time is fairly slow.  
One day after the NAVs are published, the long-short alpha is 0.19%, rising to only 0.74% after 
one week, less than half of the one-month number.  Much of the information, though not all of it, 
appears to be incorporated within one month of publication.  The three-month CAPM estimated 
alpha on the zero-investment strategy is 2.1% per month, while the three-month Fama-French 
estimated alpha remains 1.7%.   
 
5.  Implementation and robustness 
 
Are there any barriers to implementing these strategies?  While these excess returns are 
large, REITs are not generally large-cap stocks, suggesting that the trading costs of 
implementing these strategies could be large.  Our sample, which consists of the largest REITs, 
now has an average market capitalization of less than $2 billion.  Thus, it is important to get a 
sense of the transaction costs involved in trading REIT shares.  In addition, as noted by Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997) and others, there may be short-sale constraints and other impediments to 
conducting the kinds of strategies considered here.  These transaction costs put limits on 
investors’ ability to capture arbitrage profits. 
To investigate the effects of trading costs, we first calculate average bid-ask spreads on 
the REITs in our sample, using the NYSE’s TAQ database.  The average proportional quoted 
                                                 
5 In Table 3b, we include results from portfolios 1 and 4 based on the subsample of 90 periods in which both the 
high and low portfolios have some REITs.  As expected, these results are quite similar to the results reported in 
Table 3a that use slightly larger samples. 
  12spread ranges from 0.5% for quartile 4 (the high P/NAV quartile) to 0.7% or 0.8% for lower 
P/NAV stocks.  These are quite large relative to spreads for actively-traded stocks (such as 
IBM), but they are not prohibitive.  Specifically, these spreads are on the order of half of the 
monthly alphas to the long-short strategy, so they do not eliminate the excess returns.  In fact, 
quoted spreads are typically biased upward as an estimate for trading costs, because many trades 
take place inside the spread.  Given that REIT prices adjust slowly to the Green Street 
information, it might also be possible for an institution to acquire a position quite passively over 
time, at considerable trading cost savings.  In any case, it appears that the point estimates of 
excess returns far exceed the likely trading costs. 
As a more direct specification check, we exclude the least liquid REITs and replicate the 
return analysis.  By excluding the least liquid REITs that presumably have the highest 
transaction costs, we focus our estimation on REITs for which investors are most likely to be 
able to profitably arbitrage the predictability of REIT stock returns based on information about 
P/NAV.  Each period, before we sort REITs into quartiles, we exclude one-fourth of the REITs 
with the widest proportional bid-ask spreads.  We then sort REITs into quartiles based on P/NAV 
and replicate the time-series regressions.  The results for the one-month returns are in the first 
two columns of Table 4a and 4b.  If anything, the results are slightly stronger.
6  Using the one-
factor model, the long-short strategy generates an estimated alpha of 1.1% per month, or 13% per 
year and a similar estimated alpha for the three-factor model.   
Another concern is that it may be difficult to short REITs with high P/NAV.  First, it is 
important to point out that economically large alphas are possible even without shorting REITs.  
Table 3b indicates that simply buying REITs with P/NAV below 90% provides a monthly alpha 
of 1.1%, or over 13% per year, which is almost two-thirds the hedged portfolio alpha of 1.8% per 
month.  The risk of this strategy can be reduced considerably by shorting a broad stock market 
index and/or a value-oriented basket or index, either of which is easy and cheap to accomplish 
using exchange-traded funds or stock index futures. 
Despite these high alphas on the long side of the trade, we still want to explore the short-
sale characteristics of the high P/NAV firms.  Ideally, we would like to have a panel of rebate 
rates such as that collected by Geczy, Musto, and Reed (2002), D’Avolio (2002), or Jones and 
                                                 
6 Excluding the less liquid REITs increasing the predictability of returns is consistent with arbitrage activity playing 
a role in the price reversals suggested by the estimated excess returns. 
  13Lamont (2002), since rebate rates are perhaps the most important direct measure of the cost of 
shorting.  However, rebate data for our sample period are proprietary and difficult to procure.  As 
a second-best alternative, we collect short interest data on the REITs in our sample.  We find that 
short interest in these REITs is fairly substantial, and it appears that some market participants 
may be engaging in the kinds of trading strategies discussed here.  For example, based on data 
from the end of 2001, the lowest P/NAV quartile has short interest equal to 2.95 days of average 
trading volume.  In contrast, the highest P/NAV quartile has short interest representing 7.02 days 
of average trading volume.  These numbers are similar in magnitude to aggregate short interest, 
which is about five days of overall trading volume for NYSE stocks as of the end of 2002.  
Finally, we know that institutional ownership of REITs is about 50%.  Shares held by institutions 
are much more likely to be available for lending via custodians, so it seems likely that most 
REITs can be shorted without prohibitive costs. 
 
6.  Missing risk factors? 
 
Figure 3 plots the time-series of the returns to the basic long-short strategy.  The strategy 
has a positive return in almost all months, but there are occasional losses.  However, the periods 
with losses on the trading strategy do not seem obviously related to any known risk factor, based 
on the time-series plot.  Nevertheless, it is possible that these returns are related to some sort of 
systematic risk. 
For example, perhaps this strategy provides compensation for illiquidity, an effect 
originally identified in stock returns by Amihud and Mendelson (1986).  This seems possible, 
given the Table 1 evidence that high-priced, low-alpha stocks are more liquid than the REITs 
with low P/NAV.  The less liquid stocks (which have low P/NAV, since being illiquid may 
reduce the share price) may have high returns to compensate for risks associated with illiquidity 
rather than because they have a low P/NAV.  In the sensitivity analysis above, we excluded the 
least liquid REITs to confirm that transaction costs associated with illiquidity are not an 
impediment to arbitrage profits.  We now turn to whether illiquidity could affect the analysis in a 
different way – by creating a spurious relationship between observed returns and P/NAV. 
To investigate the possibility that illiquidity is a priced risk factor which creates a 
spurious relationship between returns and P/NAV, we adopt a double sort method.  First, we sort 
based on bid-ask spreads, as a measure of liquidity; second, we sort on P/NAV.  The resulting 
  14portfolios have approximately the same distribution of bid-ask spreads, but differ markedly in 
their average P/NAV.  Specifically, we sort all REITs in a given month by their proportional bid-
ask spreads.  The four REITs with the smallest spreads are then sorted by P/NAV.  The lowest 
P/NAV of the four goes into quartile 1, the next into quartile 2, and the highest P/NAV of the 
four is assigned to quartile 4.  We then repeat this assignment exercise for the four REITs with 
the next-smallest spreads.  This process continues until all REITs are assigned to P/NAV 
portfolios. 
We then look at the performance of these portfolios using the same econometric 
methodology applied earlier.  The results for the analysis of one-month returns are in the last two 
columns in Tables 4a and 4b.  If anything, the results become stronger.  Monthly risk-adjusted 
excess returns on portfolio 1 (low P/NAV) are 1.2% higher than for portfolio 4 (high P/NAV).  
As before, these return differences are statistically and economically different from zero.  Thus, 
our basic results do not seem to be driven by liquidity differences. 
In results not reported, we also look at a number of other possible ways that low P/NAV 
REITs might differ from those with high P/NAVs.  Based on data from SNL Securities, we find 
that returns are completely unrelated to the amount of leverage employed by the REIT and 
insider ownership. 
 
7.  P/NAV as a predictor of fundamentals  
 
The mean-reversion in P/NAV is strong and robust.  But why does P/NAV vary?  One 
possibility is that the variation is completely unrelated to fundamentals so that stock prices may 
deviate from fundamental value purely for idiosyncratic reasons.  However, another possibility is 
that P/NAV is just like price-earnings (P/E) ratios:  firms where NAV is growing at an above-
market rate should carry higher multiples.  This possibility would predict that differences in 
P/NAV would predict future growth in NAV (or earnings) with higher P/NAV REITs having 
faster growth in NAV per share.  Of course, it is a bit hard to imagine NAVs growing at above-
market rates, since they are supposed to reflect market values of real estate assets that are 
themselves based on discounted cash flows.  However, perhaps some managers are particularly 
skilled at doing deals, and are able to increase their REIT’s NAV faster than others in the 
industry.  Alternatively, perhaps Green Street NAVs adjust with a lag, because of the effort 
required to update them in a timely fashion. 
  15To put it precisely, if P/NAV is stationary, which it appears to be, then it must either 
predict future returns or future changes in NAV.  That is, if P/NAV is high, either future 
expected returns are low, expected NAV growth is high, or both.
7  In fact, variation in P/NAV 
could be completely consistent with an efficient market with constant expected returns if NAV 
changes were predictable.  To investigate this, we look to see whether the cross-section of 
P/NAV is associated with cross-sectional variation in future NAV growth.  Since Green Street 
releases NAVs every month, it is possible to define an NAV return in the usual fashion for 
monthly and quarterly returns: 
 R it
NAV = (NAVt + Dt) / NAVt-1,   (2) 
where Dt is the dividend paid on the REIT share in period t. 
We examine future NAV returns in the same econometric framework we used for stock 
returns.  We sort REITs into quartiles based on their P/NAV in month t – 1, form value-weighted 
portfolios, and then control for risk factors that might influence the next month’s NAV return: 
 r it
NAV = αi + βi
RMRF RMRFt + βi
SMB SMBt + βi
HML HMLt + εit,   (3) 
where the NAV return is an excess return over the T-bill rate and we again weight by the number 
of REITs in the portfolio for a given month. 
The results are in Table 5a.  Note first that NAV changes do not covary much with the 
Fama-French factors.  Factor loadings are all very small. However, the estimated alphas indicate 
that P/NAV contains a great deal of information about future growth in fundamentals.  REITs 
with low P/NAV (quartile 1) experience low NAV returns in the next month on the order of 
−0.4%, while REITs with high P/NAV (quartile 4) see excess NAV returns of about 1.0% in the 
next month.  The difference between the future NAV returns on the two quartiles is about 1.4% 
per month (see Table 5b).  This estimated alpha is slightly larger than the estimated alpha for the 
one-month long-short strategy of investing in REIT stocks of 1.0% per month.   
By this metric, slightly more than half of the P/NAV variation reflects the market’s 
ability to forecast changes in NAV and slightly less than half of the P/NAV variation mean-
reverts out through stock price changes in the next month.  One explanation is that the market is 
able to determine which REITs or which sectors will, say, appreciate fastest, but the market goes 
overboard in marking up the fast-growth REITs, and share prices rise too much. 
                                                 
7 This is an exact analog to variation in the dividend-price ratio discussed by Campbell and Shiller (1988) and in 
Chapter 20 of Cochrane (2001).  If dividend yields are stationary, then a lower dividend yield indicates either higher 
expected dividend growth, lower expected returns in the future, or both. 
  16We also examine the longer horizon predictability of changes in NAV per share by 
estimating the same model using returns with a three-month horizon.  Unlike the results for the 
predictability of stock returns, the estimated alphas for the three-month horizon are larger than 
the estimated alphas for the one-month horizon.  For example, the estimated three-month alpha 
for the long-short strategy from the one-factor model is −3.2%, which is more than double the 
estimated alpha of −1.4% for the one-month horizon.  That is, over the next three months and 
after controlling for factor risks, NAVs for the top P/NAV quartile of REITs grow 3.2% more 
than NAVs for the bottom quartile.  Perhaps Green Street analysts are adjusting NAVs with a 
lag.  Perhaps the stock market has additional value-relevant information that is not used by the 
Green Street analyst in assessing NAV. 
The NAV-return results are similar when we use fixed P/NAV breakpoints to sort REITs; 
these are reported in Tables 6a and 6b.  The difference in NAV growth between quartile 1 and 
quartile 4 in the next month is 1.5% depending on the risk adjustment used.  This is almost 
identical to the results from the standard cross-sectional sort based on relative P/NAV. 
 
8.  REITs vs. closed-end funds 
  As mentioned in the introduction, many researchers have used closed-end mutual funds 
as a window into whether stock prices reflect fundamental value.  Our results for REITs suggest 
that stock prices deviate from fundamental value but that these differences change over time due 
to mean reversion in stock prices and predictable growth in NAV.  These results have parallels in 
the closed-end fund literature.  For example, our result on the excess returns to investing in 
REITs based on P/NAV is similar to results reported by Thompson (1978) and Pontiff (1995).  
Moreover, similar to our result that P/NAV predicts future changes in the NAV of REITs, Chay 
and Trzcinka (1999) show that P/NAV predicts subsequent NAV changes for closed-end funds 
(see also Swaminathan, 1996). 
  While REIT premiums and discounts seem to behave similarly to closed-end fund 
discounts, it is unlikely that some of the explanations for closed-end fund discounts or premiums 
will also apply to REITs due to differences in the characteristics of REITs (and REIT owners) 
compared to closed-end funds (and their owners).  Put differently, stock price deviations from 
NAV and the predictability of future returns and NAV growth can exist in an environment that 
differs considerably from the closed-end fund environment.   
  17  Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) argue that the time-varying closed-end fund discount or 
premium depends on investor sentiment about equity markets.  Since closed-end funds are 
primarily held by individuals, their prices are bid up relative to NAV when individuals have a 
favorable opinion about the prospects of the stock market, but prices will fall (relative to NAV) 
when individual investors are pessimistic about the stock market.  Overall, this explanation is 
less convincing for REITs since institutional ownership plays an important role for REITs.  
Approximately half of REIT shares are held by institutions, so one would expect that individual 
investor sentiment has a smaller role for determining REIT prices.  However, as reported in 
Table 1, institutional ownership is lower for the highest P/NAV quartile than for the lowest 
P/NAV quartile (46% compared to 54%) so it is possible that individual investor sentiment does 
play some role in REIT pricing.
8
  As a further test of the Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler individual investor sentiment hypothesis, 
we return to our double sorting methodology to create portfolios that differ in P/NAV but have a 
relatively similar degree of institutional ownership.  Institutional ownership is reported on a 
quarterly basis, so we use the most recent percentage of institutional ownership to sort REITs 
into four quartiles.  Next we sort each institutional ownership quartile by P/NAV and examine 
returns for the various P/NAV quartiles.  Consistent with our earlier findings, the monthly excess 
return (α) for quartile 1 is 1.3%, versus -0.3% for the fourth quartile.  The difference between 
quartiles 1 and 4 is highly statistically significant and, if anything, larger than our base results 
from Table 2.  These findings strongly suggest that the mispricing REITs associated with P/NAV 
is not due to investor sentiment unless institutions also exhibit a similar degree of investor 
sentiment. 
  Pontiff (1996) argues that higher dividends lead to smaller mispricings on closed-end 
funds, because the dividends reduce the holding costs of the arbitrage strategy.  Put differently, 
the security can be mispriced, but the dividend is not since investors receive the full value of the 
dividend.  Pontiff finds support for this hypothesis using data for closed-end funds from 1965 to 
1985.  Given the size of the typical REIT dividends, this hypothesis would predict that REIT 
prices would have only small deviations from NAV, which is inconsistent with our results. 
                                                 
8 While the univariate comparison suggests that individuals (i.e., non-institutions) own a larger share of high P/NAV 
REITs relative to low P/NAV REITs, the REITs in the different P/NAV quartiles also vary along other dimensions, 
most notably total size. 
  18  Coles, Suay, and Woodbury (2000) report that closed-end fund premiums are positively 
correlated with insider ownership.  However, REITs have insider ownership (see Table 1) which 
is on the order of ten times the insider ownership of closed-end funds.  Despite this substantial 
insider ownership, a substantial number of REITs often sell at a discount. 
  Another major difference between REITs and closed-end funds is that REITs might be 
more volatile than closed-end fund in terms of deviations from P/NAV = 1.  There are two 
possible explanations for this difference, and both explanations arise because REITs own and 
operate real assets.  First, this probably means that REIT NAV estimates are noisier than their 
closed-end fund counterparts, and this might account for REITs’ relatively large deviations from 
P/NAV = 1.  Second, in contrast to closed-end funds, it is impossible to conduct arbitrage per se 
on a mispriced REIT.  The underlying REIT assets cannot be shorted, so a perfect hedge is not 
possible.  This means that any arbitrageur takes on basis risk with any hedge.  While we have 
identified a successful long-short strategy that earns economically and statistically significant 
alphas, these alphas are not riskless. 
 
9.  Conclusions 
In this paper, we show that REIT share prices deviate from their NAVs, where NAVs are 
estimated by Green Street Advisors, a well-respected buy-side research firm.  Using REIT data 
since 1990, we find large positive excess returns to a strategy of buying stocks that trade at a 
discount to NAV, and shorting stocks trading at a premium to NAV.  Estimated alphas are 
between 0.9% and 1.8% per month.  There is little systematic risk to this strategy, because it 
hedges out any REIT industry factor that might exist.  Trading costs and short-sale constraints 
are not prohibitive, and these alphas do not appear to be related to liquidity. 
We find that some variation in P/NAV makes sense, as premiums are positively related to 
recent and future NAV growth.  However, there appears to be too much variation in P/NAV, 
giving rise to potential profits from trading on mean reversion.  These results are clearly related 
to similar findings in the closed-end fund literature.  However, REITs have much higher 
institutional ownership, much higher inside ownership, and pay high levels of dividends.  The 
closed-end fund literature suggests that investment trusts with these characteristics should not 
deviate very far from fundamental value, and yet we document substantial temporary deviations 
from P/NAV = 1.  Even when we directly control for the extent of institutional ownership by 
  19sorting the data first by institutional ownership and then by P/NAV, the extent of mispricing, if 
anything, becomes larger.  Thus, individual investor sentiment is unlikely to explain the mean 
reversion in REIT prices. 
Also, the REIT results may be more generalizable because, compared to closed-end 
funds, REITs more closely resemble the bulk of the equity universe.  REITs are typically 
operating companies rather than passive investors, and the REITs in our sample have much 
larger average market capitalizations (over $2 billion vs. just $400 million for the CRSP universe 
of closed-end funds as of the end of 2003).  While one might ignore closed-end funds as an 
economically insignificant fraction of publicly held assets, this is harder to do for REITs, and it 
is not much of a leap to conjecture that there could be similar departures from fundamentals for 
large-cap stocks.  Thus, our results are also related to evidence of differential pricing of two 
claims to the same assets, such as the divergence between the share prices of Royal Dutch 
Petroleum and Shell Oil (see, for example, Rashes, 1999; Rosenthal and Young, 1990).  
However, REIT mispricings appear to be shorter-lived and more consistently exploitable, and 
thus less subject to the limits of arbitrage.   
In fact, the Royal Dutch-Shell example may be related to our work in a second way.  
Since it is possible to generate estimates of fundamental value for natural resource companies, 
the same kind of deviations and trading opportunities are likely present in that sector. Analysts 
often compute the value of oil companies by multiplying proven reserves by the current and 
future forecast price of oil less extraction costs.   In fact, a recent NY Times article (6/12/2004, 
Page A1) notes that analysts pay much more attention to estimated reserves than actual 
production in valuing these companies.  This observation explains the hubbub over the recent 
reserves scandal at Shell, in which Shell management overstated oil and gas reserves by 22 
percent, resulting in the removal of the company’s chairman.  Despite the accounting problems, 
future research might apply this methodology to the natural resources industry or other 
companies where it is possible to obtain reasonably reliable estimates of the fundamental value 
of a firm's assets. 
Finally, it is worth pointing out that the trading strategy analyzed here is a mean-
reversion strategy, as opposed to a momentum strategy.  This raises the interesting question of 
why REITs exhibit mean reversion at, say, 3-month horizons, while other stocks and industries 
exhibit momentum at similar horizons (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993; Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 
  201999).  There is some evidence that there is long-term mean reversion for other stocks as well, as 
momentum appears to reverse at horizons beyond a year, but it is less clear why the mean 
reversion would operate on such different time scales.  One possibility is that fundamental value 
is easier to observe for REITs, so the mean reversion can take place more quickly.  For other 
operating companies, where fundamental value is more difficult to assess, larger and more 
persistent deviations from fundamental value can occur.  In future work, we intend to pursue 
further these parallels and contrasts between REITs and other stocks. 
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The sample consists of all equity REITs covered by Green Street Advisors from January 1990 to 
December 2003.  REITs are sorted into quartiles based on their ratio of price to NAV.  NAV 
estimates are available quarterly 1990-1993 and monthly beginning in 1994.  All summary 
statistics are calculated based on data from the end of 2001. 
 
  Quartile 1  Quartile 2  Quartile 3  Quartile 4 
  (low P/NAV)      (high P/NAV)  
 
 
Number of REITs in sample  15  15  15  14 
 
Avg.  P/NAV  0.95 1.01 1.05 1.16 
 
Avg.  market  capitalization  1.09 1.25 1.95 3.04 
(in billions) 
 
Avg.  institutional  ownership  54% 54% 52% 46% 
 
Avg.  inside  ownership  15% 14% 11% 10% 
 
Avg.  quoted  spread  0.7% 0.8% 0.6% 0.5% 
 
Avg. daily volume (shares)  140,103  158,395  332,642  423,263 
 
Avg. days to cover  2.95  3.94  5.08  7.02 
(short interest / daily volume) 
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Table 2a: REIT Stock Market Return, by P/NAV Quartile, 01/1990 to 12/2003 
Dependent variable: value-weighted portfolio return 










































































































































































































































































































N=136 for one-day, one-month, and one-month regressions; N=134 for three-month regressions. 
 
Each portfolio model is estimated separately using weighted-least squares (weight = the number of REITs in the 
portfolio that month) on value-weighted stock market returns and Fama-French factors.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses.  For the overlapping three-month intervals, standard errors are corrected using the Newey-West 
procedure.  * denotes statistical significance at the 90% confidence level and ** at the 95% confidence level.  The 
data are quarterly from 1990 to 1993 and monthly from 1994 to 2003.   27
 
Table 2b: Differential Returns on Low Minus High Value REITs, 01/1990 to 12/2003 
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N=136 for one-day, one-month, and one-month regressions; N=134 for three-month regressions. 
 
Each portfolio model is estimated separately using weighted-least squares (weight = the number of REITs in the 
portfolio that month) on value-weighted stock market returns and Fama-French factors.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses.  For the overlapping three-month intervals, the standard errors are corrected using the Newey-West 
procedure.  * denotes statistical significance at the 90% confidence level and ** at the 95% confidence level.  The 
data are quarterly from 1990 to 1993 and monthly from 1994 to 2003.   28
 
Table 3a: REIT Stock Market Return Regressions Conditional on Absolute Level of P/NAV 
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Each portfolio model is estimated separately using weighted-least squares (weight = the number of REITs in the 
portfolio that month) on value-weighted stock market returns and Fama-French factors.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses.  For the overlapping three-month intervals, the standard errors are corrected using the Newey-West 
procedure.  * denotes statistical significance at the 90% confidence level and ** at the 95% confidence level.  The 
data are quarterly from 1990 to 1993 and monthly from 1994 to 2003.   29
 
Table 3b: REIT Stock Market Return Regressions Conditional on Absolute Level of P/NAV 
01/1990 to 12/2003,  
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The regressions only include month-years with observations for both Portfolio 1 and Portfolio 4.  
N=108 for one-day, one-month, and one-month regressions; N=106 for three-month regressions. 
Each portfolio model is estimated separately using weighted-least squares (weight = the number of REITs in the 
portfolio that month) on value-weighted stock market returns and Fama-French factors.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses.  For the overlapping three-month intervals, the standard errors are corrected using the Newey-West 
procedure.  * denotes statistical significance at the 90% confidence level and ** at the 95% confidence level.  The 















Table 4a: REIT Return, by P/NAV Quartile, 01/1990 to 10/2003 
Dependent Variable: One month value-weighted portfolio return 
 
  Estimated without REITs in 
the Highest Quartile of Bid-
Ask Every Month  
Double-Sorted Portfolios, 
First by Bid-Ask, then by 
Price/NAV 





























 0.43 ** 


















































































































































































0.27 **   
(0.066) 
N=136. Each portfolio model is estimated separately using weighted-least squares (weight = the number of REITs in 
the portfolio that month) on value-weighted stock market returns and Fama-French factors.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses.  For the overlapping three-month intervals, the standard errors are corrected using the Newey-West 
procedure.  * denotes statistical significance at the 90% confidence level and ** at the 95% confidence level.  The 
data are quarterly from 1990 to 1993 and monthly from 1994 to 2003.   31
 




Estimated without REITs in 
the Highest Quartile of Bid-
Ask Every Month  
 
Double-Sorted Portfolios, 





 One  Month 
 

































































N=136. Each portfolio model is estimated separately using weighted-least squares (weight = the number of REITs in 
the portfolio that month) on value-weighted stock market returns and Fama-French factors.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses.  For the overlapping three-month intervals, the standard errors are corrected using the Newey-West 
procedure.  * denotes statistical significance at the 90% confidence level and ** at the 95% confidence level.  The 
data are quarterly from 1990 to 1993 and monthly from 1994 to 2003. 
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Table 5a: REIT NAV Returns by P/NAV Quartile 

































-0.0093 **  






 0.13 ** 
(0.042) 
 











































































































































































-0.015   










-0.012   
(0.030) 
N=136 for one-day, one-month, and one-month regressions; N=134 for three-month regressions. 
Each portfolio model is estimated separately using weighted-least squares (weight = the number of REITs in the 
portfolio that month) on value-weighted stock market returns and Fama-French factors.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses.  For the overlapping three-month intervals, the standard errors are corrected using the Newey-West 
procedure.  * denotes statistical significance at the 90% confidence level and ** at the 95% confidence level.  The 
data are quarterly from 1990 to 1993 and monthly from 1994 to 2003.   33
 
Table 5b: Differential NAV Returns on Low Minus High Value REITs, 
01/1990 to 12/2003 







































































N=136 for one-month regressions; N=134 for three-month regressions. 
Each portfolio model is estimated separately using weighted-least squares (weight = the number of REITs in the 
portfolio that month) on value-weighted stock market returns and Fama-French factors.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses.  For the overlapping three-month intervals, the standard errors are corrected using the Newey-West 
procedure.  * denotes statistical significance at the 90% confidence level and ** at the 95% confidence level.  The 
data are quarterly from 1990 to 1993 and monthly from 1994 to 2003.   34
 
Table 6a: REIT NAV Returns Conditional on Absolute Level of P/NAV, 
01/1990 to 12/2003 




 One  M nth  o
 


















































































0.0021   































































































P/NAV> 110%   
α 
 














































Each portfolio model is estimated separately using weighted-least squares (weight = the number of REITs in the 
portfolio that month) on value-weighted stock market returns and Fama-French factors.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses.  For the overlapping three-month intervals, the standard errors are corrected using the Newey-West 
procedure.  * denotes statistical significance at the 90% confidence level and ** at the 95% confidence level.  The 
data are quarterly from 1990 to 1993 and monthly from 1994 to 2003.   35
 
Table 6b: Differential NAV Returns on Low Minus High Value REITs, 01/1990 
to 12/2003 




 One  M nth  o
 









Include FF   
Portfolio 1 
 












-0.017 **  







































P/NAV > 110%   
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 0.11   












The regressions only include month-years with observations for both Portfolio 1 and Portfolio 4.  
N=108 for one-month regressions; N=106 for three-month regressions. 
Each portfolio model is estimated separately using weighted-least squares (weight = the number of REITs in the 
portfolio that month) on value-weighted stock market returns and Fama-French factors.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses.  For the overlapping three-month intervals, the standard errors are corrected using the Newey-West 
procedure.  * denotes statistical significance at the 90% confidence level and ** at the 95% confidence level.  The 












 Figure 1 
 
Ratio of Price/Net Asset Value (P/NAV)  
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Figure 2 
 
Cumulative Daily Returns 


























 37 Figure 3 
 
Difference Between Returns for Portfolio 1 minus Portfolio 4  
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